INTRODUCTION
This paper will deal with the following question: what happens in a service system where the service is supplied by two competitive firms? By a service system we mean any system where customers have to wait in lines before they are served. As we will show, we cannot apply the usual results of economic theory to service systems. For example, in ordinary economic theory two firms supplying the same good will always sell it at the same price. This result is not always true for the case of service and waiting lines. We will discuss the conditions under which two service firms selling at the same price are not in equilibrium.
A discussion of queuing systems with single server (that is, a monopoly) are found in the works of Edelson [1] , Naor [3] , Knudsen [2] and others. However, there is no mention in the literature of a general equilibrium in a queuing system with more than one server. Between these two extreme cases, the general equilibrium and the determinate single-firm model, lie the partial equilibrium cases, and this paper deals with one of these.
TWO FIRMS, TWO PRICES
When a good is sold at different prices, price-equalization forces come into play. These forces do not operate when the firms supply services and the customers may have to wait in queue.
Suppose that only one firm reduces its price. Some of the customers will now prefer to receive the service at a lower price, but this causes the queue at the low-price firm to get longer as an increasing number of customers turn to it. In the high-price firm, on the other hand, the queue becomes shorter and waiting time is reduced. Customers who sufficiently prefer a shorter waiting time will not go to the low-priced firm even though the price is lower. At some stage this process of customers transferring from the high-price firm to the low-price firm will come to an end. We show later that the point where the process ends can be an equilibrium.
Before turning to the detailed model, let us clarify the difference between our model and a model of two firms selling different goods. The waiting for a service is clearly part of the service itself. If there is a different waiting time in each firm, then the service produced by each firm is a different commodity. But if the commodity is not the same in both firms, then of course the price need not be the same. The main feature of our problem is that we cannot say a priori whether there will be two commodities or only one: that is, whether or not the waiting time will be the same in both firms is determined by the system itself.
A similar problem was discussed by Smithies [6] in his paper about duopolistic spatial competition. In both models there are two firms, two prices, and partition of the customers between the two firms. In Smithies' model the customer is affected by freight rates, while in our model the customer considers also the waiting cost. The main difference is that in our model the price is the only independent variable (waiting time is a dependent variable), while in Smithies' model both price and location are independent variables. This difference, and the fact that waiting time is not the same as freight cost, does not allow us to compare the results of the two models.
But in one respect a similarity can be found. We will show that usually both firms charge different prices and the streams of customers are not the same, but if no customer leaves without service-the prices are the same, and each firm serves one-half of the customers. This last result is equivalent to the case in Smithies' model, where one firm is located at each quartile of the market and serves exactly one-half of the customers, and the prices are the same. Smithies shows the conditions that are necessary for this result. But, under general conditions, the firms are not at each quartile, and the prices may differ.
Assume a system with a service rendered by two firms. In both firms the quality of the service itself is the same and the service time is distributed exponentially with the same mean service-time parameter. Each firm fixes its service price so as to maximize profit. We assume that there is no co-operation between the firms. (Later in the paper we shall relax this assumption.)
There is a Poisson stream of customers arriving at the firms. Each customer has three alternatives-to choose firm 1, to choose firm 2, or to leave without receiving service. The choice must be made by considering the cost of waiting, the expected waiting time in each firm, and the price of the service in each firm.
Two computer centres which compete in the same market is an example of such a model. The expected waiting time and the prices in both centres are known to all the customers and potential customers. A potential customer is included in the stream of customers even though he never bothers to show up at either line because of the high prices and the long expected waiting time. By assumption the customer's choice is made according to the prices and the expected waiting time and is not dependent on the current waiting line. That is, we assume a high transaction cost of moving if the customer is already at one of the centres.
We assume that the cost of waiting is a linear function of waiting time (here defined as the sum of queuing time and service time) and that each customer has a different waitingcost function, so that each customer is characterized by the parameter C which denotes the cost of waiting one unit of time. We assume that there exists a distribution function which shows the probability that the waiting cost parameter does not exceed C.
We shall use the following notation: R = the reward from receiving the service (assumed equal for all customers) Equations (8) and (9) define the expected waiting time in each firm as a function of the service price.
We have so far assumed that P1 >P2. But if the price is the same in both firms, some difficulties arise. First, oc is not defined when P1 = P2 for it then follows that the expected waiting times must be the same, i.e. W1 = W2, so that the denominator of the expression is zero. Second, in the preceding discussion we could distinguish between the customers of the two firms according to their waiting cost. With equal prices we cannot make this distinction. Exactly half of the total stream arrives at each firm.
In order to avoid these difficulties, we can look at the limiting values of xc as Pl--P2. Now W1 must be close to W2 as P1 approaches P2, and for the expected waiting times to be similar, the arrival rates of each stream must also be similar. That is, 21-*2 as P1-+P2.
Using the oc, ,B notation, the ti stream parameters are
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..
In the limit when 21-22, we have: F(a)= IF(#). ..4.(10)
This equation implicitly gives the limit of ac as P1-+P2. Each firm chooses an optimum price for every price of the other firm, and a pricechanging process takes place in the two firms. The process ends, with the firms' equilibrium, when neither firm wants to change its own price. Let P*, P* be the prices chosen at this point.
EQUAL OR UNEQUAL PRICES
The main question of this paper is whether P* = P* is consistent with equilibrium. We analyse this question as follows: first, the partial derivatives 07t1/0P, and 07r2/OP2 are found; second, the values of these partial derivatives are calculated at points where P1 = P2. P = P* are equilibrium prices if We will show that the demand function is not continuous at this point, so that the only way to write the conditions for a Nash equilibrium point is by inequalities like (13).
If a7t1/0P1>a7r2/aP2 whenever P1 = P2, then conditions (13) for equilibrium with equal prices do not hold and the system is not in equilibrium when both firms sell at the same price.
Let us begin with a7t2/0P2. From (12) and (6) Now, f(,B) is the probability that there are customers with high waiting costs who want to receive the service but leave the queue because they have to wait too long. Thusf(J3) = 0 if all customers receive the service, while if some customers leave without being served, f(O3) > 0, and the price cannot be the same in both firms. The difficulty is that ,B depends on the price, so that we cannot say whether or not prices will in fact be equal.
Assume, however, that the system diverges (that is, A/2 > V). Then if all the customers remain in the queue, the waiting time will extend to infinity, and, in such a system, f(13) is positive. In other words, in a system where A/2> V, each firm will sell at a different price.
On the other hand, if A/2 is very small compared with V, waiting time will be relatively short, even if all the customers receive the service. In that case, we have F(fl) = 1, so it is reasonable thatf(fl) = 0 and that the price will be the same in both firms. Unfortunately, condition (22) is not sufficient for equal price equilibrium (a counter example can be found). The reason is that we cannot be sure thatf(,B) has vanished. The firms may end up with such high prices that some customers leave without service.
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN FIRMS
In this section we relax the assumption of no co-operation. The two firms now aim at maximizing the sum of their profits, that is, max Xr = ir1 +X2. We consider here whether their prices will be equal. We first determine the necessary conditions for maximum profits under equal prices and then calculate how profits change when one price is changed.
We start by setting P, = P2 = P, that is, by forcing the prices to be equal. The intensity of the stream of customers who do not leave without service is A: Thus, 07r/OP1 is always positive and the two firms can always increase their total profit by selling their services at different prices.
That is an obvious result following the assumption that different customers have different waiting costs. In the initial case, the two firms charge the same price. Then, one firm can raise its price without any change in the total number of customers. The result is higher joint profits. Suppose that the prices are the same in each firm, and the customers are divided between the firms so that those with higher waiting cost are served in firm 1. Now, let us take the one with the lowest waiting cost in firm 1 and transfer him to the second firm. A decrease in the expected waiting time in firm 1 will enable the firm to raise its price in such a way that those who were served in firm 1 continue to be served there. In conclusion, one firm raises its price, the second firm doesn't change its price, the total number of customers remains the same, and the result is higher joint profits. 
